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PREEMPTION OF SECTION 1983 BY TITLE
VII: AN UNWARRANTED DEPRIVATION OF
REMEDIES
Nancy Levit*
Few laws have been subject to more extreme shifts in judicial
theory than section 1983.1 Following ninety years of dormancy, section 1983 was resurrected in the 1960s and early 1970s as a viable
tool for the protection of civil rights. In the last decade, however, a
growing number of Supreme Court opinions have once again restricted the scope and coverage of the section.
One of the most recent steps in the contraction of section 1983
are the holdings of Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association2 and Smith v. Robinson,3 which

hold that a section 1983 cause of action may be precluded by a comprehensive statutory scheme. Several federal district courts have applied this proposition to bar actions under section 1983 when an alternate cause of action is available under Title VII of the Civil
* Law Clerk, Honorable Frank G. Theis, Chief Judge Emeritus, United States District
Court for the District of Kansas. B.A., 1980, Bates College; J.D., 1984, University of Kansas.
The author wishes to thank Professor Joan Mahoney, Richard Ney, Professor Elinor Schroeder and Kevin Travis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. See Rader, Section 1983, The Civil Civil Rights Action: Legislative and Judicial
Directions, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 571 (1985). Section 1983 provides inter alia:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
2. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). The Court held that the parties did not have a private right of
action under the Federal Water Pollution Act, ch. 785, 62 Stat. 1115 (1948)(amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)) and Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982)).
3. 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (denying plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees, which would normally be available under § 1983, because plaintiff asserted a meritorious claim under the Education of the Handicapped Act).
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Rights Act of 1964. 4 The doctrinal inconsistency of a handful of Supreme Court opinions has left lower courts perplexed about the interrelations between Title VII and section 1983. This article reviews the
overlap of Title VII and section 1983, analyzes the theories of implied repeal or exclusivity currently being applied in combined Title
VII and section 1983 cases, and examines the viability of section
1983 as an independent remedy for civil rights violations. The article
concludes that because of the convoluted procedural requirements of
Title VII, the preclusion of a section 1983 cause of action could dramatically reduce the chances for a plaintiff to have a colorable civil
rights claim decided on the merits and adequately remedied.

I. THE EXPANSION OF SECTION 1983
Following the Civil War, Congress enacted a series of laws
designed to enforce the provisions of the newly ratified thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. 5 Section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 18716 provided civil remedies for deprivations of federal
rights "under color of" state law. Due to an early series of restrictive
Supreme Court decisions, the Act lay essentially unused for almost
ninety years.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982)(prohibiting employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin). See W. CONNOLLY & M. CONNOLLY, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE To EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 5-6 (rev. ed. 1979).

5. The thirteenth amendment was ratified in December of 1865. U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIII. The fourteenth amendment was adopted by Congress in 1866 and ratified by the states
in 1868, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The fifteenth amendment was ratified in 1870. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI. Close on the heels of the amendments came the succession of civil rights
statutes known as the Force Acts. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of Feb. 28,
1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. Professor Mahoney
suggests that because no common law action existed to remedy violations of constitutional
rights and because not until Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), did the Supreme Court hold that such a cause of action arose directly under the Constitution, "in the absence of section 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment
would presumably have been enforced only by the federal government." Mahoney, The Prima
Facie Section 1983 Case, 14 URB. LAW. 131, 131 (1982) (footnote omitted).
6. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1982)).
7. See Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883);
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). During the early part of the twentieth
century, the scope of § 1983 was confined primarily to voting rights and discrimination cases.
See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (involving a black denied registration); Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (involving blacks who were denied the right to participate in
Democratic Party primary election).
The Court restricted the reach of these provisions, not only because it felt the tre-
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In 1961 the Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe v. Pape began a
revival of section 1983. One of the primary reasons section 1983 had
historically been ignored was an early Supreme Court decision which
held that an illegal act or one not authorized by state law was
neither an act "under color of" state law nor state action.' Monroe
removed this restriction and held that when a state officer's actions
violated state law they were to be considered "under color of" state
law for purposes of section 1983.10 In addition, Monroe established
that the substantive rights preserved by the Civil Rights Act of 1871
were precisely those guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.,, Finally, Monroe indicated that exhaustion of state remedies was not
required to maintain a section 1983 action in federal court.
The Monroe decision generated a flood of civil rights lawsuits in
the federal courts.1 3 It has been suggested that "the Supreme Court
has attempted to limit the scope of section 1983 ever since
Monroe." 4 However, at least two subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court have broadened the reach of section 1983.15
mendous pressure exerted by Southern conservatives on the race question, but also
because it was concerned about the extent to which the federal government should
be allowed to regulate areas that traditionally rested within the states' domain.
Banks, The Scope of Section 1985(3) in Light of Great American Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Novotny: Too Little Too Late?, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 581-82 (1982)
(citing J.H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR, 203-07 (1961)).
8. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (damage action against policeman and the City of Chicago,
where policeman allegedly entered and ransacked plaintiff's home, while the occupants were
forced to stand naked; plaintiff was subsequently arrested but was never charged), overruled,
Monnell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
9. Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904) (holding city's construction of a
railroad tunnel did not qualify as state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment because it was unauthorized and illegal). See Comment, Section 1983 and the New
Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 49, 51 (1976).
10. 365 U.S. at 187.
11. Id. at 171. Previous decisions had more narrowly construed the scope of protectable
interests. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 § 2.02 (Supp. 1982).
12. 365 U.S. at 183. "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id.
13. In 1960 only two hundred and eighty suits were filed in federal court under all the
civil rights acts; in 1972 approximately eight thousand claims were filed under § 1983 alone.
Developments in the Law, Section 1983 And Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1172
(1977).
14. See Shapiro, Section 1983 Claims to Redress Discriminationin Public Employment: Are They Preempted by Title VII?, 35 AM. U.L. REv. 93 (1985); Comment, Civil
Rights: The Supreme Court Finds New Ways To Limit Section 1983, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 776,
779 n.21 (1981).
15. The Supreme Court began to restrict certain aspects of § 1983 in the 1970s even as
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In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,1 a unanimous Supreme
Court repudiated previous decisions17 which held that section 1983
was available only to redress infringements of personal liberty. The
Lynch Court held that section 1983 also reached deprivations of
property rights. 8
After expanding the scope of protectable interests in Lynch, the
Supreme Court also enlarged the categories of entities subject to suit
under section 1983 in Monell v. Department of Social Services."9 In
Monroe the Court had read the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 to preclude damage actions against municipalities.2" In
Monell the Court lifted the blanket immunity for municipalities by
holding that municipalities and local government bodies were "persons" amenable to suit under section 1983.21 The Monell Court limited this liability by holding that it could be imposed on municipalities only for violations effected pursuant to an official policy or
custom. 22 After Monell the number of section 1983 suits filed in federal courts leaped again,23 and the crowding of the federal court
dockets played a significant role in the calls to restrict the scope of
section 1983.24 By the late 1970s the Supreme Court had begun to
narrow the contours of section 1983 suits.
II.

THE CONTRACTION OF SECTION

1983

The Supreme Court is deciding an ever-increasing number of
it broadened the reach of § 1983 in other areas. A legislative expansion during this era was the
passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp.
1986), which provided for payment by defendants of successful plaintiffs' attorney's fees.
16. 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (holding that the delay between seizure of property and the
federal government proceeding for its disposition violated the fifth amendment due process
requirement).
17. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (holding that a Jersey City ordinance
that forbade the distribution of printed material regarding the National Labor Relations Act
discriminately and arbitrarily suppressed public assembly).
18. 405 U.S. at 543-44.
19. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (plaintiffs were pregnant employees compelled by the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York to take an
unpaid leave of absence before such a leave was medically indicated).
20. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-88 (1961).
21. 436 U.S. at 690-91. "[T]he Court reexamined the same legislative history and
changed its mind." Rader, supra note 1,at 580.
22. 436 U.S. at 694. Thus, municipalities cannot be sued on a respondeat superior theory for the acts of their employees.
23. See Rader, supra note 1, at 581.
24. See Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1172; see also Aldisert, Judicial
Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction:A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and
the Federal Caseload, LAW & Soc. ORD. 557, 558-59 (1973).
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cases that will preclude litigants from maintaining section 1983 suits
in federal court. These decisions have affected a variety of aspects of
section 1983: who can be sued, the types of conduct actionable, the
interests protected, and the immunities available. Part of the impetus
for defense attorneys to whittle away at the section 1983 cause of
action is the increased availability of attorney's fees under section
1988 for plaintiffs who prevail in civil rights actions.25 To establish a
section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show the following elements: 1)
an entity acting under color of state law; 2) who subjects or causes
to be subjected any person; 3) to the deprivation of any rights; 4)
that are secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Through various means the Supreme Court has more stringently interpreted each element of the section 1983 cause of action.
A.

"Under Color of' State Law

According to the statutory language, section 1983 reaches only
persons acting "under color of" state law. The practices challenged
must involve some state or local government action. While private
parties are not ordinarily subject to suit under section 1983, a private entity may be reached under the section if its conduct is "fairly
attributable to the State."2
In 1974, the Supreme Court began to interpret restrictively
what constitutes state action. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,217 the Court held that even extensive and detailed regulation of a
utility by the state and the utility's status as a state-created monopoly that provided essential services did not convert the actions of the
business into state action for purposes of section 1983. The Jackson
Court ruled that there must be a sufficiently close nexus between the
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
-action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.28
See Larson, Current Developments in the Law of Attorneys' Fees, in II CIVIL
295-305 (1986).
26. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (holding that the attachment of property in a prejudgment procedure which did not include a prior hearing constituted
a deprivation of constitutional rights). "[T]he deprivation must be caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by
a person for whom the State is responsible." Id.
27. 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that a privately owned, heavily regulated electric utility which did offer notice or a hearing prior to termination of plaintiff's electric service was not
sufficiently connected to the regulating state to satisfy the state action criteria of the fourteenth amendment).
28. Id. at 352.
25.

RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK
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In Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks,29 the Supreme Court elaborated that
either the private entity must exercise a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state or the state must compel the private
action.
The trend toward a limited concept of state action was continued in 1982 with the Court's decisions in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn3"
and Blum v. Yaretsky.3a In Rendell-Baker and Blum the Court determined that public funding of schools and nursing homes was not a
sufficient imprimatur to make the acts of the recipients state action. 32 The state action requirement, and the Supreme Court's narrow construction of that element, substantially limit the availability
of section 1983.
B.

"Subjects or Causes To Be Subjected"

For liability to accrue under section 1983, a defendant's conduct
must subject a plaintiff to a deprivation of his or her federal rights.
The Supreme Court has markedly constricted the scope of culpable
official action that will satisfy this requirement. In 1976, the Court
held in Rizzo v. Goode3" that a plaintiff must establish direct participation by an official to state a claim under section 1983 and that
such plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome. 4
Depending on the underlying constitutional violation alleged, a
plaintiff may also be required to prove the state of mind of the defendant. The intent requirement varies according to the nature of the
rights involved.35 The Court has exhibited an increasing tendency to
narrowly construe the types of conduct that section 1983 was
29.

436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that the sale of respondent's household goods by ware-

houseman pursuant to state law after her eviction was not state action).
30. 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private school receiving 99% of its funding from the government was not acting under color of state law with respect to the discharge of personnel).
31.

457 U.S. 991 (1982) (nursing home's decision to discharge or transfer medicaid pa-

tients was not state action, even though home received state funds, because decisions regarding
patient care were not related to funding).
32. 457 U.S. 830; 457 U.S. 991. See also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)
(a public defender representing an indigent client does not act under color of state law).
33. 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (involving a class action by a minority group against the mayor
of Philadelphia for failing to stop a pattern of discriminatory police behavior).
34. Id. Either an exercise of control or a failure to exhibit control can create liability.
35. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977)(requiring proof of a discriminatory purpose for a claim of racial discrimination
under the equal protection clause); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (requiring
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" to establish a violation, of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976)).
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designed to remedy. In the 1986 companion cases of Daniels v. Williams 6 and Davidson v. Cannon,37 the Court overruled its holding of
five years earlier in the case of Parrattv. Taylor,"8 that a state offi-

cial's negligent act could constitute a deprivation of life, liberty or
property remediable by section 1983.11
C.

"Deprivationof Any Rights"

In addition to limiting when official conduct rises to the level of
a constitutional tort, the Court has also reduced the body of tort
violations actionable under section 1983. In Paul v. Davis,40 the Supreme Court held that state torts were not a fortiori actionable
under section 1983 merely because a state official was the perpetrator. The test advanced by the Court in Paul was whether the alleged

damage constituted a deprivation of an interest specifically protected
by the fourteenth amendment.4 The Paul Court feared the creation

of "a font of [federal] tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States. 42
36. 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
37. 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
38. 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (concluding that the loss of prisoner's mail containing hobby
material by negligent prison officials constituted a deprivation of property).
39. "We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent
act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property." Daniels, 106
S. Ct. at 663 (emphasis in original).
40. 424 U.S. 693 (-1976) (Davis brought suit alleging damage to his reputation due to
police circulation of a flyer bearing his name and photograph and identifying him as a known
shoplifter).
41. Thus, rights expressly granted by the Constitution or rights that have been deemed
fundamental would be the types of constitutional torts actionable under the Court's rationale.
Id. at 712. See Comment, supra note 9, at 68. In addition, interests recognized by the Constitution would be protected under § 1983 if they were "initially recognized and protected by
state law." Paul, 424 U.S. at 710. The Paul opinion provided two examples of state-created
interests: the right to operate a motor vehicle and the right to parole.
In Paul the Court held that defamation by a state official standing alone, did not rise to
the level of a constitutional deprivation. Id. at 711-12. In decisions subsequent to Paul, courts
have held that the stigma accruing from the defamation must result in a further deprivation of
a right otherwise secured by the Constitution or state law. To measure the sufficiency of defamation claims, the appellate courts have devised a "stigma-plus" standard. See, e.g., Moore v.
Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that reassignment of a policeman to patrol
duties does not meet the "stigma-plus" standard when there was no loss in civil service status);
Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 960 (1977)(a
press release charging state officials with abusing their positions coupled with simultaneous
discharge of those officials satisfied the "stigma-plus" test).
42. 424 U.S. at 701.
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D. State and Federal Relations
The Supreme Court's concern that state tort law would be swallowed by section 1983 was evidenced by a series of decisions commencing in 1976 with Bishop v. Wood. 3 The Court held in Bishop
that property interests secured by section 1983 must be determined
by reference to state law. In Allen v. McCurry," the Court held that
a section 1983 action would be precluded by a prior state criminal
proceeding reaching the same issues. The Court next held in several
cases that section 1983 would be preempted not only by state adjudications but even by the mere availability of state judicial remedies.
In Ingraham v. Wright,45 the Court ruled that because a student
who had been subjected to corporal punishment could bring a state
tort action for damages, no additional federal remedy was required.
The principle applied in Ingraham to a claim of intentional deprivation of liberty was applied in Parrattv. Taylor" to a claim of
negligent deprivation of property. The Parratt Court held that a
prison inmate was not entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing to determine the propriety of his loss of a hobby kit because the available
state tort remedies were sufficient. 4 The Court concluded that a
postdeprivation remedy was all the process the plaintiff was due.48
As one commentator notes, the doctrine developed in Ingraham and
Parratt"relegates procedural due process claims to the state courts
and effectively removes the procedural due process claims from the
scope of [section] 1983." 4 Finally, the Supreme Court may have
effectively channeled some civil rights claims to the state courts by
restricting both pendent claim 50 and pendent party5 jurisdiction.
43. 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (holding that a policeman's job is not a constitutionally
protected property right requiring a hearing before discharge under the fourteenth amendment
due process clause unless state law confers such a right).
44. 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (holding that collateral estoppel prevents respondent from relitigating a fourth amendment or fourteenth amendment search and seizure question already decided in a state court proceeding).
45. 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (stating that community supervision of the school provided
additional procedural safeguards).
46. 451 U.S. 527 (1981); see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47. 451 U.S. at 544.
48. Id.
49. Lenhoff, Federal Courts and the Decline of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 64 MICH. BJ. 532,
534 (1985). In 1984, the Supreme Court extended the Parratt and Ingraham holdings to
claims of intentional property deprivation. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). See also
Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75
(1978).
50. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (prohibiting
federal courts from instructing state officials on how to conform their conduct with respect to
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E.

Immunities

The spate of Supreme Court opinions reducing the circumstances under which section 1983 suits could be brought in federal
court was paralleled by a stream of decisions enlarging the range of
absolute and qualified immunities available to various state officials
under section 1983. Absolute immunity is available in section 1983
suits to certain "functional categories" of officials. 52 The Supreme
Court has granted absolute immunity to judges,53 those performing
essential judicial functions, 5 4 legislators, 55 those who perform essential legislative functions, 58 prosecutors, witnesses, 58 and the President of the United States. 9
Over the years the Court has developed qualified immunity for
officials who commit deprivations of rights in good faith.6 0 Qualified
immunity is available to all public officials not entitled to absolute
immunity. Prior to Jhe Court's 1982 decision in Harlow v. Fitzger-

ald,"' the qualified immunity defense was comprised of objective and
subjective components. 2 In Harlow the Supreme Court transformed
state law).

51. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (refusing to extend pendent jurisdiction to
state law claim against county where Congress has already by implication declined to extend
federal jurisdiction).
52. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983) (holding that all persons integrally
involved in the judicial process are immune from liability, including a police officer whose
perjured testimony resulted in plaintiff's conviction).
53. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (upholding the immunity of a circuit
judge responsible for the ex parte decision to sterilize a minor).
54. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 343; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976) (suit
against prosecuting attorney for using false testimony and suppressing evidence at trial which
resulted in petitioner's conviction).
55. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376-78 (1951) (plaintiff requested damages
from an investigation by a California legislative committee).
56. Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405
(1979)(holding defendants immune from liability to the extent they were acting in a legislative
capacity).
57. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31.
58. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 331-34.
59. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982) (upholding the absolute immunity of
the President for his official actions).
60. The qualified immunity defense originated in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967),
and was refined in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975). See generally Comment, Civil Rights: A Modification of the Qualified Immunity
Defense in Actions Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 630, 632-33
(1985)(tracing the development of § 1983 good faith immunity).
61. 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (involving White House aides who participated in the illegal
discharge of a government employee).
62. Id. at 815-16.
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the test into an entirely objective one: whether the defendant's conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."' ° The Harlow qualified immunity doctrine will foster the summary resolution of defendants' immunity claims, since whether the law in question was clearly
established when the conduct complained of occurred is a legal question to be resolved by the court.64 Furthermore, Harlow posits an
objective test concerned solely with whether the law is clearly established with respect to a particular right. Therefore, the state of mind
is irrelevant: a "defendant could commit a malicious act against the
plaintiff and still enjoy qualified immunity, provided that there was
no constitutional right applicable to the malicious act as of the time
that act occurred." ' 5
In sum, the last decade has seen a narrowing of the entities
amenable to suit under section 1983 and a concomitant expansion of
immunities available to those who can be sued under section 1983.
The Supreme Court has also reduced both the types of conduct actionable under section 1983 and the interests secured by the statute.
Furthermore, the Court's concern with the potential displacement of
state law by section 1983 has been manifested in a series of decisions
limiting the ways in which civil rights actions can be brought in federal courts. The cumulative impact of these trends is a significant
restriction of access to federal courts in civil rights litigation.
III.

RIGHTS "SECURED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND

LAws"

Under section 1983, any person who is deprived "of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" may
sue for damages. The portion of section 1983 most recently targeted
6 the
for erosion is the phrase "and laws." In Maine v. Thiboutot,"
Supreme Court held that the reference to "laws" in section 1983
"broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law."16 7 The Court read the plain language of section 1983
to allow the respondents to employ that statute as a vehicle to redress an alleged violation of the Social Security Act. 8
63. Id. at 818. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
64. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368, 375 n.6 (10th Cir. 1983).
65. Lenhoff, supra note 49, at 533.
66. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

67.
violations
68.
permitted

Id. at 4. The Court specifically rejected a construction that § 1983 applied only to
of federal civil rights or equal protection laws. Id. at 6-8.
Id. at 5-6. Thus, an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipient was
to bring a § 1983 action to require state compliance with the Social Security Act, 42
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Amid concerns that the Thiboutot decision "would go far toward converting section 1983 into a state counterpart of the Administrative Procedure Act,"6 the Supreme Court decided Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman.70 In Pennhurst the Court
limited the expansive construction of Thiboutot by holding that section 1983 could not be used to implement federal statutes which created no enforceable rights."1
The Court limited the Thiboutot doctrine further in Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.7 2 The plaintiff in Sea Clammers filed a section 1983 action alleging damage to fishing grounds from ocean dumping of sewage.7734
The Court concluded that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972,"5 contained comprehensive enforcement mechanisms which indicated congressional intent to preclude a cause of action under section 1983.76 Thus, section 1983 is not available when Congress has
created remedies for the enforcement of a federal statute that explicitly or implicitly preclude a section 1983 action.
In 1984 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Sea
Clammers in Smith v. Robinson.77 The plaintiffs in Smith sought an
award of attorney's fees by relying on section 1983 as an additional
remedy to their principal claim under the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA)78 to secure appropriate public education for a
handicapped child. The Supreme Court dismissed the section 1983
claim because it concluded that the EHA's "carefully tailored administrative and judicial mechanism" was the exclusive avenue of
relief for claims of the handicapped. 9
U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1985 & Supp. IV 1986), even though the Social Security Act did not
provide a private right of enforcement.
69. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of FederalLaw, 49 U. Cm. L.
REV. 394, 394 (1982).
70. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).

71.

Id. at 18.

72.

453 U.S. 1 (1981).

73. Id. at 4.
74. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
75. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982).
76. The Sea Clammers majority went out of its way to reach the issue of § 1983 preclusion. 453 U.S. at 19-21. The parties never raised the issue. See Brown, Whither Thiboutot?
Section 1983, Private Enforcement, and the Damages Dilemma, 33 DEPAuL L. REv. 31
(1983).

77. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
78.
79.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1441 (1982).
468 U.S. at 1009.
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In the wake of Smith and Sea Clammers courts have attempted
to curtail the circumstances under which section 1983 claims can be
brought in conjunction with other types of actions. A growing number of federal district court decisions are applying the exclusivity
theory of Sea Clammers and Smith to preclude combined Title VII
and section 1983 actions. The next section analyzes the theories
which lower courts have employed in addressing situations in which
section 1983 claims are preempted by Title VII.
IV.

PREEMPTION OF SECTION

1983

BY TITLE

VII

The provision of an exclusive avenue of relief is nothing new to
the employment discrimination field. In fact, defendants who argue
that Title VII should supplant section 1983 rely upon a variety of
antecedents other than Smith and Sea Clammers. A capsulization of
the cases addressing this issue of overlapping remedies is important
to an understanding of the arguments made in the Title VII exclusivity cases.
A.

Exclusive and Overlapping Remedies

In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,80 the plaintiff alleged he
had been discharged from employment because of his race. Plaintiff
presented his claim to an arbitration panel and then instituted a Title VII action in federal court. The Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's ruling that the plaintiff had waived his right to bring a
Title VII suit by submitting his grievance to the arbitration procedure. The Court held that "the legislative history of Title VII
manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable
state and federal statutes." '
A year later, the Supreme Court reiterated the Alexander holding in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency. 2 In Johnson a black
employee filed a Title VII suit charging racial discrimination in his
employer's seniority policies. After a number of procedural delays,
the plaintiff filed a supplementary complaint under section 1981
based on the same set of circumstances. The Supreme Court ruled
that a Title VII action did not preempt a suit under section 1981,
80. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
81. Id. at 48. "The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather
than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination." Id. at 4849.
82. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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since Title VII and section 1981 are "separate, distinct and independent" remedial statutes.83
In the year following Johnson the Supreme Court again addressed the interplay of Title VII and section 1981. Specifically at
issue in Brown v. General Services Administrationa4 was section
717, which extends the protection of Title VII to federal employees.8 5 The substance of the allegations in Brown virtually replicate
those in Johnson: a black employee filed a complaint under both Title VII and section 1981 alleging racial discrimination. Unlike the
result reached in Johnson, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of the section 1981 claim partially on the basis that section
717 of Title VII "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of
discrimination in federal employment."88
The reasoning of the Court in Brown is curious. The Court focused on the comprehensiveness of the remedial scheme provided by
Title VII as justification for its exclusivity, even though the Court
specifically rejected this rationale a year earlier in Johnson.87 Furthermore, the Brown Court assumed that Congress intended section
717 to be an exclusive remedy because Congress apparently thought
no other remedies were available to federal employees for employment discrimination. 8 The Court stated that "the relevant inquiry is
not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law,
but rather what its perception of the state of the law was."8 9 As one
commentator has remarked, "the Brown Court's inference that Congress intended to extinguish all pre-existing rights that escaped its
83.

Id. at 461. The specific holding in Johnson was that the filing of a charge under

Title VII did not toll the running of the statute of limitations for a parallel § 1981 action. Id.
at 466. The Johnson Court examined the legislative history of Title VII, in which Congress
commented that Title VII and § 1981 "augment each other and are not mutually exclusive."

Id. at 459 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., IstSess. 19 (1971)).
84.

425 U.S. 820 (1976).

85. Id. at 835. Congress added
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.

§ 717 to Title VII when it passed the Equal Employment
§

2000e-16 (1982).

86. 425 U.S. at 821, 835.
87.

In Johnson the Court wrote: "Despite Title Vll's
range and its design as a compre-

hensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in

his search for relief." 421 U.S. at 459.
88. 425 U.S. at 828-29. Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent that the assumption
that § 717 provides the only judicial remedy for federal employees was erroneous, since the

legislative history reveals that § 717 was purposely enacted without an amendment specifying
it as the exclusive remedy for federal employees. Id. at 837-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

89. Id. at 828 (footnote omitted).
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notice is unconvincing." ' 0
In 1979 the Supreme Court addressed the concurrent use of another portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and Title VII in Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny.9 The
male plaintiff in Novotny alleged that he was fired by his private
employer in retaliation for expressing his support for female employees who charged the management with sex discrimination. Novotny
asserted violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) in separate counts. The section 1985(3) claim was premised on alleged injury due to a violation of a specific section of Title VII. n2 The question before the Court was "whether the rights created by Title VII
3
may be asserted within the remedial framework of § 1985(3)."
The Court held that section 1985(3) could not be invoked to redress
violations of Title VII,9 4 reasoning that a section 1985(3) action
would circumvent the comprehensive remedial scheme delineated in
Title VII.95 The Court ruled that Novotny could not claim violations
of two independent rights because, although Title VII conferred
rights on him, section 1985(3) created no substantive rights.96 Therefore, the Novotny Court concluded that "deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under §
1985(3)."9 7
The Novotny decision has been a primary impetus for the recent
torrent of decisions addressing the issue of whether a Title VII claim
displaces a cause of action under section 1983.98 Title VII exclusivity
90. Comment, Civil Rights-Employment Discrimination-Section 1985(c) Unavailable to Vindicate Title VII Rights, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 114, 123 n.47 (1979).
91. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).

92. By adding the § 1985(3) claim, Novotny hoped to recover compensatory and punitive damages. His recovery under Title VII would have been limited to reinstatement and
possibly up to two years of back pay. Id. at 374 n.16.
93. 442 U.S. at 377 (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 376.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 372. In separate concurrences, Justices Powell and Stevens observed that §
1985(3) was intended to provide a remedy only for the violation of fundamental constitutional
rights. Id. at 381 (Powell, J., concurring), 384-85 (Stevens, J., concurring). One writer suggests that the Court avoided the question of implied repeal of existing rights with this analysis,
because "under ... [the] Court's view of section 1985(c) the right asserted by Novotny did
not exist prior to the passage of Title VII." Comment, supra note 90, at 121. The Novotny
dissenters, however, contended that the majority's holding was tantamount to a silent repeal of
§ 1985(3). 442 U.S. at 393 (White, Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
97. 442 U.S. at 378.
98.

In addition to Smith and Sea Clammers and the Alexander-Johnson-Brown-

Novotny line of cases, courts discussing Title VII exclusivity have considered the Supreme
Court's decision in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). In Preiser the Court examined
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was first discussed in 1982.11 Prior to that time, courts assumed that
section 1983 and Title VII afforded parallel remedies. 100 The Title
VII exclusivity decisions may be grouped analytically into three categories, which can be labeled "complete preemption theory," "independent rights theory," and "and laws analysis."
B. Displacement of Section 1983 by Title VII
1. Complete Preemption Theory. - In Torres v. Wisconsin
Department of Health and Social Services,1"1 male corrections officers challenged a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) plan
under which certain posts at a women's correctional facility were
staffed only by women.102 The plaintiffs alleged that the BFOQ program violated Title VII and sections 1985(3) and 1983.103 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the civil rights claims, arguing
that the causes of action under sections 1983 and 1985(3) were preempted by the exclusive remedial scheme of Title VII. 1 4
The Torres court dismissed both the section 1985(3) and the
section 1983 claims. With respect to the cause of action under section 1985(3), the court observed that the male corrections officers
10 5
challenged the BFOQ plan on grounds also protected by Title VII.
The court determined that because the "charged constitutional deprivation inheres in the very creation and implementation of an allegedly discriminatory plan ... the claims are not sufficiently discrete

to escape the Novotny proscription." 106 Although the plaintiff argued
that Novotny involved discrimination by a private employer, the
court rejected the distinction.
While the court acknowledged that the signals from the Suthe relationship between § 1983 and the more precisely drawn habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). The Court held that a prisoner seeking release from confinement for
violations of his constitutional rights was limited to habeas corpus as his only remedy. Id. at
500. If prisoners were allowed to assert the same substantive rights via § 1983, the Court
reasoned, they would be permitted to thwart the state exhaustion requirement of the habeas
statute. Id. at 489-90.
99. See Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168
(W.D. Wis. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).
100. See, e.g., Grano v. Department of Dev., 637 F.2d 1073, 1082 (6th Cir. 1980) (a
plaintiff alleging unequal treatment is essentially asserting the same claim under either Title
VII or § 1983).
101. 592 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
102. Id. at 923.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 927.
106. Id.
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preme Court regarding preemption of section 1983 were "decidedly
mixed," the court extended the Novotny rationale of section 1985(3)
preemption to section 1983.117 To support its conclusion, the Torres
court relied on the Brown analysis that Title VII provides a comprehensive statutory scheme.10 8 Next the court looked at the policy articulated in Preiser v. Rodriguez, °8 that "a precisely-drawn, detailed statute preempts more general remedies."110 Finally, the court
based its decision on the Sea Clammers holding that the availability
of specific statutory schemes may preclude the simultaneous invocation of section 1983.111 The Torres court concluded that "the reme-

dial framework of Title VII could be just as effectively circumvented
by a litigant suing under section 1983 as it could by a party seeking
relief under section 1985(3). " 112

The precise holding of Torres is somewhat difficult to capsulize.
The court held that the plaintiffs could not sue under section 1983
because they had a remedy available under Title VII. 113 The court's
reason for this ruling, however, was that the plaintiffs' section 1983
"allegations are so tied up with their cause of action under Title VII
that they are . . . nearly unidentifiable as discrete claims .... -114
Although the Torres court implied that a section 1983 claim could
be brought in tandem with a Title VII claim if the section 1983
claim were premised on a discrete constitutional basis, the decision
left unclear what would constitute such an independent basis.1 15
Less than a year after its decision in Torres, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin clarified its position in Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee.11 The plaintiff in Ratliff alleged that she was discharged from employment due to her race, in
violation of Title VII, section 1983 and section 1985(3). The Ratliff
court relied on its reasoning in Torres and dismissed both of the civil
rights counts because the plaintiff had a Title VII remedy available.
107. Id. at 928.
108. Id.
109. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
110. Torres, 592 F. Supp. at 929.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 928.
113. Id. at 930.
114. Id.
115. "This is not to say, of course, that there may never be an action in which discrete
claims of employment discrimination and some conspiratorial deprivation of equal protection
of the laws might spring from the same set of operative facts--only that this is not such a
case." Id. at 927.
116. 608 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D. Wis. 1985), rev'd in part, 795 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1986).
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As in Torres, the court found in Ratliff that the plaintiff's section
1983 claim was "inherently bound up with her Title VII claim such
that her sole remedy is provided by Title VII." a7 The court analyzed
the interrelation of the basis for the section 1983 cause of action and
the basis for the Title VII claim as follows:
While the plaintiff may argue that the conspiracy, procedural due
process, retaliation and equal protection claims pertain to distinct
rights which are guaranteed under the Constitution, the Court feels
that these claims are part and parcel of the same cause of action.
Had the plaintiff not been terminated from her job or harassed in
her employment situation as she contends, she would have no claim
for damages for any of these other alleged constitutional and statutory violations. Each of her claims is premised upon her assertion
that she was discriminated against because of her race, the very
action that Congress intended to prohibit and provide a remedy for
by means of Title VII." 8
In Torres, a section 1983 equal protection challenge to a BFOQ
plan was held not to state a cause of action discrete from a Title VII
attack on the BFOQ plan. In Ratliff the same court held that claims
of race discrimination, conspiracy and equal protection brought pursuant to section 1983 duplicated a Title VII challenge to the plaintiff's termination. While the court in Torres appeared to leave open
the possibility of employing section 1983 and Title VII in the same
case, 19 in Ratliff the court foreclosed the use of Title VII and section 1983 to challenge the same conduct. If conspiracy, equal protection and race discrimination are not constitutional claims distinct
from Title VII, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine what
would present an independent constitutional claim.
Two more recent decisions also belong in the complete preemption group. In Reiter v. Center ConsolidatedSchool District No. 26JT,120 the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
gave lip service to the independent rights theory, but employed a
rationale which unavoidably arrived at complete preemption. The
Reiter court held that claims of gender and religious discrimination
are not independent of Title VII because they are prohibited by Title
VII.' 21 Under this circular reasoning, it is impossible to conceive of a
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.at 1128.
Id.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
618 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1985).
Id. at 1462-63.
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type of claim that would be both prohibited by and independent of
Title VII. 122 Thus, according to Reiter, no claim that can be remedied by Title VII can be framed as a section 1983 suit.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
also adopted a somewhat misguided approach to exclusivity analysis.
In Keller v. Prince George's County Department of Social Services,123 the black female plaintiff instituted a civil rights suit under
Title VII and section 1983. The court stated that "[i]t is not the
rights asserted that determine separateness of remedies--otherwise,
no rights or remedies could be preempted. It is the underlying conduct the law is asked to redress that determines what remedies can
be asserted." 24 The court, however, then proceeded to analyze the
plaintiff's claim as follows: "In this case, the underlying conduct-employment discrimination-is exclusively redressed by Title
VII.,,125
Since both Title VII and section 1983 can be used to remedy
employment discrimination, the court did not actually evaluate the
"underlying conduct" for which relief was sought. 126 Employment
discrimination is a generic label, encompassing many types of wrongful behaviors that differ in substantive content. The Keller court simply begged the question of when one employment discrimination
statute preempts the other. Under Keller, no employment discrimination suit could ever be brought with both Title VII and section
1983 claims.
According to the complete preemption theory, if an employment
discrimination suit is brought with both Title VII and section 1983,
Title VII becomes the exclusive remedy and the section 1983 count
is dismissed. In other words, any time Title VII and section 1983 are
applied to the same set of facts in an employment discrimination
case, the availability of a Title VII remedy preempts the use of section 1983.
2. Independent Rights Theory. - Most courts that have addressed the viability of parallel Title VII and section 1983 claims
have adopted the independent rights theory. Under this theory, a
122. The difficulty with the court's approach is that it does not analyze whether the
basis of the Title VII claim is a right created by Title VII or one protected independently of
Title VII, such as those protected by the fifth or fourteenth amendments.
123. 616 F. Supp. 540 (D. Md. 1985).
124. Id. at 543-44.
125. Id. at 544.
126. In this case racial discrimination formed the underlying conduct.
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plaintiff may sue on both Title VII and section 1983 grounds when
the section 1983 violation rests on a right independently guaranteed
by the Constitution. If the substantive basis of the section 1983
cause of action is a violation of Title VII, however, the section 1983
claim is dismissed and the case proceeds only on the Title VII claim.
Two early cases are representative of the independent rights
theory. In Zewde v. Elgin Community College, 2 7 the plaintiff
brought a section 1983 action and a Title VII claim against a community college, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of
race and national origin.128 The court held that Zewde could maintain a section 1983 action even though the facts supporting the civil
rights action were identical to those underlying the Title VII claim,
since the alleged race-based job discrimination would be in violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 29 The
court rejected the defendant's analogy to Novotny and Sea Clammers, because "[i]n neither case was the plaintiff asserting constitutional rights or substantive rights other than those created by Title
VII or the FWPCA [Federal Water Pollution Control Act]."130

In fact, the Zewde court reasoned that the logic of Novotny
supported the independent rights theory. In Novotny the Supreme
Court held that rights "created by Title VII" could not be asserted
through section 1985(3)."' Zewde, however, was "asserting rights
'created by' the Fourteenth Amendment, not by Title VII.' 32 The
Zewde opinion distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in Sea
Clammers:
It is one thing to say, as the Supreme Court did in... [Sea Clammers], that a comprehensive and specific statute like the FWPCA
demonstrates implicit congressional intent to repeal the § 1983
right of action for violations of that statute. It is quite another
thing to say ... that the comprehensive Title VII framework dem-

onstrates implicit congressional intent to repeal the § 1983 right of
action for concurrent violations of the Constitution.-'

The Zewde court also distinguished two cases relied on by the
Torres court. According to the court in Zewde, the Brown decision
127.
128.
129.
130.

601 F. Supp. 1237 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1245 n.10.
Id. at 1245.

131.

442 U.S. 366, 377 (1979).

132.
133.

601 F. Supp. at 1246.
Id.
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did not command the result reached in Torres, since in Brown "there
was no question of implied or express repeal of an existing and clear
legislative grant of redress for constitutional violations; nothing akin
to § 1983 had been on the books for federal employees. 134 In contrast, Zewde squarely addressed the issue of implied repeal. Finally,
the court found that the Preiser decision was distinguishable in the
same way as Novotny and Sea Clammers: in Preiser the plaintiff
asserted, via section 1983, a violation of the same substantive right
that could have been asserted through a more specific statute. The
Zewde court held that "a plaintiff may state a constitutionalclaim
under § 1983 even if it stems from the same operative facts as a
Title VII claim."' 36
In Day v. Wayne County Board of Auditors13 6 the Sixth Circuit
tracked the reasoning of the Zewde opinion but reached the opposite
result. The plaintiff in Day sued his state employer for retaliatory
discharge based on the employee's filing of employment discrimination charges. 13 7 The court dismissed the section 1983 claim since
that claim was premised on a violation of Title VII and therefore no
independent right was infringed. The Day court reasoned that "[i]t
would be anomalous to hold that when the only unlawful employment practice consists of the violation of a right created by Title
VII, the plaintiff can bypass all of the administrative processes of
' 38 Some courts
Title VII and go directly into court under § 1983."1

have arrived at results in accordance with Day."""
3. "And Laws" Analysis. - One court has constructed a theory diametrically opposed to the complete preemption theory developed in Torres. In Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social
Services,'40 a demoted state employee filed a combined Title VII and
section 1983 action against his employer, alleging sexual harassment.' 4 ' The court recognized that Title VII was "the only substantive basis of the § 1983 claim."'4 2 The Huebschen court nevertheless
134.

Id. at 1248.

135. Id. at 1246 (emphasis in original). Accord Green v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 609
F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (N.D. 1II. 1985).

136. 749 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir. 1984).
137. Id. at 1200.
138. Id. at 1204.
139. See, e.g., Tafoya v. Adams, 816 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1987); Hervey v. City of Little

Rock, 787 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1986); Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1984).
140.

547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Wis. 1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).

141.

Id.at 1172.

142.

Id.at 1173.
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held that a plaintiff may sue under section 1983 when the sole basis
43
for the section 1983 claim is a violation of Title VII.
Initially, the court rejected the extension of the Novotny holding
regarding section 1985(3) exclusivity to section 1983. The Huebschen court projected how the Novotny concurrers and dissenters
would analyze whether a section 1983 claim could be premised entirely on an infringement of Title VII. According to Huebschen, the
three Novotny dissenters, who would have allowed a section 1985(3)
claim to be based on only a Title VII violation, would arrive at the
same result with respect to section 1983.4 In addition, Justices
Powell and Stevens, who concurred in Novotny, reasoned that section 1985(3) prohibited only conspiracies to deny constitutional, but
not statutory, rights. 145 Thus, the Huebschen court assumed that
they would permit actions under section 1983 for violations of statutes, such as Title VII. Tallying the votes, the Huebschen court concluded that "at least five justices would rule that a Title VII violation alone may provide the substance for an action under § 1983. "114 6
After determining that the Novotny holding should be limited to
section 1985(3) actions, the court analyzed the ambit of claims pursuable under section 1983:
In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 encompasses virtually all congressional enactments by virtue of the
phrase "and laws" in the statute ....Even the dissenters in Maine

believed that § 1983, by the term "and laws," included violations
of equal rights legislation .... Obviously, Title VII is equal rights
1 47
legislation.

Since section 1983 protects "rights, privileges or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws" without any delimiting language, the
Huebschen court reasoned that one of the laws enforceable via sec148
tion 1983 is Title VII.
143. Id. On appeal the circuit court held that the district court erred in permitting
plaintiff to maintain an action under § 1983 based on Title VII because the plaintiff's supervi-

sor was not a person who could be sued directly under Title VII. 716 F.2d at 1171.
144.

547 F. Supp. at 1175.

145.

Id.

146.

Id.

147. Id. at 1174 (citations omitted).
148.

Id. at 1175.
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FLAWS IN THE THEORIES

Complete Preemption Theory

The complete preemption theory depends upon two steps of
analysis. First, the extension of the Novotny rationale to preempt
section 1983 suits based on Title VII requires an analogy between
sections 1983 and 1985(3). Second, the complete preemption theory
necessitates a particular reading of the Novotny holding.
In drawing an analogy between the sections, the Torres court
simply asserted that section 1983 could be circumvented as easily as
section 1985(3).' 1 The Ratliff decision noted that section 1985 is
similar to section 1983 in that neither statute is the source of any
substantive rights.1 50 While both statutes only provide remedies for
violations of the rights they designate, the rights protected by the
two civil rights statutes differ.
Section 1985(3) is targeted at private conspiracies which deprive individuals of "equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.'' Section 1983 reaches more
broadly, protecting against deprivations of rights secured by all other
provisions of the Constitution and by federal statutes. 52 Moreover,
since section 1983 was designed to enforce the fourteenth amendment, which applies solely to state action, section 1983 redresses
only deprivations "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage .... ."153 On the other hand, section 1985 also applies to private actions.
Novotny involved discrimination by a private employer. In essence the Supreme Court's holding prohibited overlapping section
1985 and Title VII remedies for private discrimination. The argument can be made that the Novotny rationale should apply with less
force to section 1983 actions because the victims of government discrimination should have a more complete arsenal to combat the machinery of the state. Viewed another way, since most constitutional
rights do not apply to private action, private conspiracies are not as
149.

See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

150. 608 F. Supp. at 1127 (citing Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442
U.S. 366, 372 (1972)).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
152.

In fact, Thiboutot expressly rejected a reading of § 1983 which would have con-

fined the scope of the statute only to equal protection based claims. 448 U.S. at 8.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
TIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS D3-2 (rev. ed. 1987).
153.
154.
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apt to trod on fundamental rights as are actions taken by the state.
Thus, plaintiffs suing under section 1983 and Title VII should be
afforded both remedies.
The critical problem with the Torres opinion lies in its misinterpretation of the Novotny holding regarding exclusivity. The Novotny
Court held that "deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot
be the basis for a cause of action under § 1985(3). ' ' 155 The Torres
court engages in some intellectual sleight of hand when it holds that
Novotny compels the conclusion that a wrong redressable under Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under section
1983.156 A much more limited variety of actions is uniquely created
by Title VII than is redressable under Title VII. 157 Thus, the broad
holdings of Torres and Ratliff, that claims under Title VII and section 1983 cannot co-exist in a case, regardless of the interrelation
between the two statutes, simply is not supported by a fair reading of
Novotny.
In essence, the complete preemption theory works an implied
repeal of section 1983.158 Such a result is not warranted by the Congressional history of Title VII, a history that the Torres court declined to re-examine. 159 As the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin noted in Meyett v. Coleman,60 "Congress has the authority to repeal § 1983 by providing an exclusive
remedy elsewhere, but the fact that a statute contains a comprehensive remedial scheme does not mean that it was Congress' intent to
rule out additional remedies under § 1983."I'l The legislative history
of Title VII clearly indicates that it was not intended to displace
existing section 1983 remedies. In 1964,112 and again in 1972,13
155.
156.
157.

442 U.S. at 378 (emphasis added).
592 F. Supp. 922, 927 (1984).
For example, a cause of action for sexual harassment is specifically a Title VII

creation. Race discrimination, on the other hand, while prohibited by Title VII, is also proscribed by a number of other laws.
158. See supra note 96.
159. 592 F. Supp. at 930. The court refused to engage in an exhaustive restatement of
the legislative history.
160. 613 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
161. Id. at 40.
162. 110 CONG. REc. 13650-52 (1964).
163. The House Report stated:

In establishing the applicability of Title VII to State and local employees, the Committee wishes to emphasize that the individual's right to file a civil action in his own
behalf, pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983, is in no way affected .... Title VII was envisioned as an independent statutory authority meant to provide an aggrieved individual with an additional remedy

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1987

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:265

Congress contemplated and consciously rejected amendments which
would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for unlawful employment practices. Thus, in effecting a de facto repeal of section
1983, the complete preemption theory runs contrary to the legislative
history of Title VII. 164
Furthermore, it is unclear how far the complete preemption theory goes. The theory posits that conduct which gives rise to violations
of both Title VII and section 1983 may be redressed only under Title
VII. Courts employing complete preemption have not addressed
whether a suit could be dismissed if a case to which Title VII might
apply is brought solely under section 1983. All of the cases discussing this issue have involved complaints that have asserted both
claims.
Under a natural extension of the Torres and Ratliff court's fear
that plaintiffs will wiggle around the statutory requirements of Title
VII, arguably Title VII should be the exclusive remedy for any
claims to which it might apply. It is obviously much easier for courts
to dismiss a section 1983 claim if there is still a viable Title VII
claim extant. But the logic of the theory should apply equally when a
plaintiff has not filed an otherwise applicable Title VII claim because, for instance, the plaintiff failed to file a timely charge with
the EEOC. If Title VII has preempted section 1983, the preemption
theory should apply even though the plaintiff has missed the shorter
statute of limitations under Title VII. This would work an extraordinarily harsh result, however, since a plaintiff who has suffered
wrongs recognized by two statutes might be left without even a single remedy.
Also unaddressed by current complete preemption cases is how
the theory would deal with a set of facts that after a trial might be
found to be a violation of one statute but not the other. For example,
the facts might not establish retaliation in violation of Title VII, but
would arguably support the finding of a violation of first amendment
to redress employment discrimination ....

The bill, therefore, by extending juris-

diction to State and local government employees does not affect existing rights that
such individuals have already been granted by previous legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

2137, 2154,
164. The Zewde court commented that "[c]ourts should require express legislative intent to repeal statutory rights of action for constitutional violations. At the very least, judges
should be more hesitant to find an implied repeal of a constitutional right of action than to find
one of a statutory violation." 601 F. Supp. at 1246.
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rights. 165 In sum, the complete preemption theory-which has yet to
be theoretically fleshed out-hinges on a superficial analogy between
two civil rights statutes, a misreading of Supreme Court precedent,
and an ignorance of legislative history.
B. Independent Rights Theory
While the courts applying the independent rights theory concur
that a section 1983 action can remain alongside a Title VII claim if
there is an independent constitutional basis for the section 1983 action, these courts disagree as to when there is a discrete constitutional violation. The two areas in which courts have split over the
existence of an independent right are suits alleging sex discrimination and suits brought against a state employer. In Meyett v. Coleman, 66 the court held that the male plaintiff who contended that he
was discriminated against in employment on the basis of sex had
asserted a cause of action premised on the Constitution, independent
of his parallel Title VII claim. 167 The court determined that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, which has been held to prohibit sexual discrimination in employment,16 8 provided a constitutional guarantee independent of Title VII. 6 9
In Storey v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System,'1 the female plaintiff filed a combined Title VII and section
1983 suit with claims similar to those made in Meyett. The court
allowed the plaintiff to recover under both section 1983 and Title
VII, reasoning that "the right to be considered for employment without regard to her sex

. . .

was not created by Title VII. The Consti-

tution itself addresses the matter by its guarantee of equal
protection." 17'
A United States District Court judge for the District of Kansas
165. See, e.g., Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 793 F.2d 745, 749-50 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 649 (1986).
166. 613 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
167. Id.
168. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
169. 613 F. Supp. at 40-41. The court stated that the fifth amendment's prohibition
against sexual discrimination in employment is applicable to the states under the fourteenth

amendment and a plaintiff should be free to pursue remedies made available by both Title VII
and § 1983.
170. 600 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
171. Id. at 841-42. Accord Jensen v. Board of County Comm'rs, 636 F. Supp. 293, 299
(D. Kan. 1986). "Because plaintiff's right to challenge discrimination based on gender was not
created by Title VII, but in fact preexisted that act, plaintiff is free to pursue his remedies
under both theories." Id.
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apparently disagrees with the conclusion reached in both Meyett and
Storey that allegations of sexual discrimination present a constitutional claim distinct from Title VII concerns. The plaintiff in Goodall v. Sedgwick County'72 alleged that her employer had committed
sexual discrimination and sexual harassment, in violation of both Title VII and section 1983. The court dismissed Goodall's section 1983
cause of action, ruling that she had not articulated a deprivation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States independent of her claim under Title VII.'" a Unlike the courts in Meyett
and Storey, the Goodall court did not look to the source of the rights
allegedly violated, but focused instead on the nature of the harm
suffered by the plaintiff:
[W]hile it is conceivable that the plaintiff may be able to demonstrate sex discrimination or a sexually harassing work environment
existed during her tenure with the County Sheriff, there is no indication from the evidence of any additional violation of the plaintiff's rights. The court can discern no pattern or practice of depriving females of equal protection of the law nor any First
Amendment violation which is distinguishable from plaintiff's
claim 6f being subjected to sexually offensive
or discriminatory
conduct on the job in violation of Title VII. 174
Apparently, the Goodall court would require proof of a harm separate from that remediable under Title VII for there to be an independent constitutional violation.
Two courts have determined that section 1983 actions against
state employers by their very nature involve allegations of independent rights violations. In Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community
Schools,17 5 the Seventh Circuit concluded that "the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VII have granted public sector employees independent rights to be free of employment discrimination."' 1 6 The
court in Skadegaard v. Farrell"' reached the same conclusion and
stated that a holding giving "public employees so victimized more
rights than their privately employed counterparts finds its justificaNo. 82-1914, slip. op. (D. Kan. Oct. 11, 1985)(on file at HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW).
173. Id. at 6.
174. Id. at 4-5. The "pattern or practice" language is curious, since "pattern or practice" is distinctly a Title VII concept. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1322 (1983).
172.

175.

766 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1985).

176. Id. at 302. See Pollard v. City of Chicago, 643 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (N.D. I11.
1986).
177.

578 F. Supp. 1209 (D. N.J. 1984).
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tion in the 'state action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment
which mandates this result." 1 8 The Meyett court, however, carefully
avoided reliance solely on the fourteenth amendment. 79 In Goodall
the court did not consider whether a section 1983 action against a
state employer, without more, asserted the violation of an independent right. 80
A primary difficulty with the independent rights theory is that
courts disagree on when a constitutional claim has an independent
basis. The Meyett and Storey decisions state that sexual discrimination is proscribed by constitutional guarantees independent of Title
VII.' 8' Goodall, on the other hand, is perplexing. 82 The Goodall
decision failed to analyze whether there is a constitutional right not
to be discriminated against on the basis of sex. By focusing solely on
whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff was remediable under Title VII, the Goodall court precluded any inquiry into whether a
plaintiff may have suffered a deprivation of rights under section
1983 resulting in the same sort of harm. Arguably, under Goodall, if
the ultimate harm suffered by a plaintiff is protected by Title VII,
the section 1983 remedy is unavailable. Thus, the Goodall decision
may simply be a complete preemption case masquerading under the
independent rights theory. Similarly, Trigg and Skadegaardmay belong in the "and laws" camp, since both decisions conclude that any
time a section 1983 action is brought against a state employer-a
sine qua non of section 1983 suits-the violation of a right independent of section 1983 is presented. 183 Given the limited analysis by
the courts applying the independent rights theory, it is unclear
whether there will be a constitutional litmus test for what constitutes
an independent right.
C.

"And Laws" Theory

The "and laws" theory is more difficult to analyze because it is
178. Id. at 1218.
179. See supra note 166.
180. The Goodall court raised and rejected a range of potentially available independent
constitutional claims, but failed to mention an action against a state employer among them.
No. 82-1914 at 5. Thus, the decision could be read as holding sub silentio that an action
against a state employer does not present a discrete constitutional claim.
181. See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 174.

183. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding that conduct
which is "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment is also conduct "under color
of state law" for purposes of § 1983).
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not as fully developed as the other two theories. As formulated by
the Huebschen court, a plaintiff may always bring parallel Title VII
and section 1983 actions because one of the laws enforceable
through section 1983 is Title VII. The theory rests on a literal interpretation of the Thiboutot decision: "and laws" means "and
laws." 18 One commentator has suggested that "[n]o one contends
that the decision means literally what it says-that section 1983 authorizes private enforcement of all federal statutes. ' 185 Other commentators disagree and suggest that Thiboutot means what it says:
Although the historical record is far from unambiguous, the preferable interpretation of section 1983 is ... that "and laws" compre-

hends all laws, not merely particular kinds of laws. To reach this
conclusion is not, however, to say that an express enforcement
mechanism in a governing substantive statute should never be
taken as exclusive. For example, the section 1983 action could not
survive as88 a means to enforce a statute that explicitly excludes that
remedy.'
Huebschen fails to reconcile Thiboutot with Sea Clammers.
The obvious import of Sea Clammers is that not all federal statutes
are a valid source of section 1983 claims. Huebschen does not address when a statutory enforcement mechanism may preempt the
"and laws" provision. of section 1983. In short, the "and laws" theory, as delineated by the Huebschen court, ignores the holding of
Sea Clammers.
Furthermore, the reach of the "and laws" theory is uncertain.
Unanswered by Huebschen is whether a public employee whose
cause of action is based on rights provided by Title VII may bring a
section 1983 action without exhausting the administrative remedies
provided by Title VII.18 7 Finally, adequate theoretical support of the
"and laws" theory requires analysis of why public employees, who
would be permitted to stack remedies under Title VII and section
1983, should be afforded greater rights than private employees, who
are relegated to Title VII rights alone."88
184. 547 F. Supp. at 1174.
185. Brown, supra note 76, at 34 (emphasis in original).
186. Sunstein, supra note 69, at 411.
187. Presumably, the answer is no, since such a result would allow the wholesale circumvention of Title Vll's remedial scheme.
188. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. It might be argued that public law
makes advances in terms of affording rights which lay the groundwork for private law to later
confer similar rights. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). For example, states have enacted legislation
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VI.

PROPOSED APPROACH

The independent rights theory is correct as far as it goes in affording plaintiffs the ability to obtain redress under two statutes for
the violation of two independent rights. When a plaintiff claims the
infringement of a constitutional or statutory right that existed prior
to Title VII, he should be able to maintain either a Title VII action
or a section 1983 action or both.1 89 The independent rights theory,
however, assumes that if a section 1983 suit is based solely on a
violation of Title VII, the section 1983 remedy was intended to be
displaced. Thus, the independent rights theory shares the flaws of the
complete preemption theory by working an implied repeal of section
1983 with respect to rights created by Title VII. 19 °
The complete preemption theory and the independent rights
theory stem from the Sea Clammers and Smith holdings that section
1983 causes of action may be precluded by comprehensive statutory
remedial schemes. The Sea Clammers Court held that "[w]hen the
remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to
preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983."'19 No theory has adequately addressed whether Title VII provides a satisfactorily "comprehensive" remedial scheme.
Both the independent rights theory and the complete preemption theory presume congressional intent to supplant section 1983 belimiting public employers' freedom of action in job terminations. This legislation has led to
recognition of public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine which governs private employment relations. See generally Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimination,58 TEMPLE L.Q. 65, 67 (1985) (discussing the rights of at-will employees
concerning their terminations).
189. This position is supported by courts employing independent rights theory or "and
laws" analysis, as well as by commentators. See Shapiro, Section 1983 Claims to Redress
Discrimination in Public Employment: Are They Preempted by Title VII?, 35 Ari,. U.L. REV.
93, 95 (1985); Note, Title VII Preempting Section 1983 in Sex Discrimination-Torresv.
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 333 (1985). See
also Jensen v. Board of County Comm'rs, 636 F. Supp. 293, 296 (D. Kan. 1986)(indicating
that the significant differences in procedures, remedies and standards between Title VII and §
1983 make it advantageous for an employee to bring actions under both statutes).
190. Both theories depend on a revisionist view of Title VII's legislative history. See
supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. Both presume Congressional intent to supplant §
1983 with Title VII because of the detailed mechanisms for handling employment discrimination claims provided by Title VII.
191. 453 U.S. at 20. One commentator has questioned the Sea Clammers holding that
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) preempted the use of the § 1983 remedy,
since the FWPCA contained broad savings clauses specifically intended to preserve any preexisting remedies. See Sunstein, supra note 69, at 428.
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cause of the detailed framework provided by Title VII for handling
employment discrimination claims. However, comprehensiveness
must mean more than simply the amount of detail contained in a
statute. It has been suggested that a statute may be considered comprehensive only when adequate relief is available to plaintiffs under
its remedial provisions."9 2
A recent Supreme Court .decision evaluated an analogous section 1983 preemption issue in precisely this fashion. In Wright v.
City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority,19' the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' section 1983 action was preempted by the Housing Act of 1937. The Court held that the remedial mechanisms provided by the Housing Act were not "sufficiently
comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that Congress
intended to foreclose a section 1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants' rights secured by federal law."' 94
The question then is whether Title VII's remedial scheme is adequate in terms of affording plaintiffs complete relief. One method of
assessing the adequacy of Title VII relief is by comparison with the
remedies available under section 1983. Title VII contains a complicated series of administrative exhaustion requirements. 95 Compli192. See, e.g., Note, Preclusion of Section 1983 Causes of Action by Comprehensive
Statutory Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1183 (1982).
193. 107 S. Ct. 766 (1987).
194. Id. at 771. Lower courts are employing the Wright test of comprehensiveness by
focusing on the efficacy of the remedial mechanisms in the statutes that are argued to preempt
§ 1983. See, e.g., Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Food
Stamp Act's remedies are not sufficiently effective to indicate an intent to foreclose a § 1983
cause of action); Young v. Sedgwick County, 660 F. Supp. 918 (D. Kan. 1987) (questioning
Title VII's remedial scheme as to whether it is adequately comprehensive to work an implied
repeal of § 1983).
195. A plaintiff initiates a Title VII suit by filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This complaint must be filed within 180 days of the
alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(e) (1982). Separate time deadlines apply in states which have established local authorities to deal with employment discrimination. In such states, a plaintiff may not file an EEOC charge until sixty days after the
commencement of the state or local proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982). The plaintiff
must file with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice or within thirty days
of the state agency's termination of its proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). The
EEOC may attempt to effect a conciliation agreement between the parties, failing which the
EEOC issues a "right to sue" letter. The plaintiff has ninety days from receipt of the right to
sue letter in which to file a civil suit. 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(f) (1982). This capsulization of the
administrative route is overly simplified. Complications arise in determining the time of occurrence of the discrimination, the circumstances under which the state proceedings have been
terminated, issues of appeal of agency action, and various other matters. See B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 173, at 1013-1175. One judge has remarked that Title VII is "rife with
procedural requirements which are sufficiently labyrinthine to baffle the most experienced law-
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ance with these provisions is mandatory: if a plaintiff fails to jump
through the requisite administrative hoops with precision, his claim
may be barred. 196 This can work particularly harsh results in individual cases. 197 In contrast, section 1983 possesses no exhaustion
requirements. 198
Differences exist between Title VII and section 1983 as to what
types of damages are available. Title VII allows only compensatory
relief, such as back pay.' 99 Moreover, Title VII has a two year statute of limitations for back pay awards.2 00 On the other hand, section
1983 permits compensatory and punitive damages as well as equitable relief.2 0 ' Furthermore, jury trials are generally not required in
actions,202 whereas they are usually available in civil rights
Title VII
20 3
cases.
The limitations on relief afforded by Title VII are apparent
from a comparison of that statute with section 1983. In many circumstances, Title VII and section 1983 may provide complete relief
for plaintiffs only if they can be used in tandem. For instance, a
plaintiff who files a suit for sexual harassment, a Title VII-based
204
cause of action, may be limited to declaratory or injunctive relief.
If the same harassment suit is filed under both Title VII and section
1983, the measure of the plaintiffs relief could include compensatory
and punitive damages. Courts and commentators have repeatedly
noted that "[t]he inertia of discriminatory traditions ...

can only be

curtailed by using a 'full arsenal' of statutory weapons."

205

If the

yer." Egelston v. State Univ. College, 535 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1976).
196. See, e.g., White v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 566 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 581 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1978).
197. See, e.g., Dixon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 787 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.
1986)(EEOC's forwarding of a charge to the state agency under a worksharing agreement
pursuant to which the state agency then waived jurisdiction did not constitute a "filing" with
the state agency; therefore, the plaintiff could not take advantage of the extended 300-day
charge filing period for deferral states).
198. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Section 1983 actions are
subject to relevant state statutes of limitation. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(g) (1982).
200. Id.
201. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (compensatory damages); Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30 (1983) (punitive damages).
202. Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
203. Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981).
204. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
205. Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment
Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 258, 260 (1977) (citing Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 468 (1975)). A plaintiff should be able to bring suit "under as many
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section 1983 remedy is precluded, Title VII would be a poor substitute in the vindication of individual plaintiffs' rights.
The argument may be made that in some cases Title VII remedies are adequate substitutes for section 1983 relief. Thus, the argument would be that individual courts should assess the comprehensiveness of Title VII in particular cases with respect to the nature of
the plaintiff's claims and the relief sought. This approach presents
severe feasibility problems. If the theories regarding Title VII's exclusivity are any indication, courts probably would differ dramatically in their conclusions regarding Title VII's comprehensiveness.
Individual plaintiffs would not know whether to maintain both
causes of action and would be forced to litigate the issue of comprehensiveness anew in each case. Furthermore, such a position is theoretically indefensible, since it would invite courts on an ad hoc basis
to render meaningless the "and laws" reference of section 1983 and
eviscerate the Thiboutot decision.
The reconciliation of Thiboutot and Sea Clammers turns on an
analysis of comprehensiveness. Smith and Sea Clammers suggest
that section 1983 remedies are precluded only by comprehensive
statutory remedial schemes. Title VII's provisions are not sufficiently
remedial to be considered comprehensive. It is inappropriate to apply
the preclusion rationale of Sea Clammers to Title VII. Thus, the
availability of a Title VII remedy should not preempt the maintenance of a section 1983 cause of action. Courts should adopt the
"and laws" theory expressed in Huebschen, but should approach it
theoretically in terms of the comprehensiveness of available
remedies.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The overlap between Title VII and section 1983 has come under
scrutiny in the lower federal courts recently. This current of cases
that analyze whether Title VII preempts section 1983 is part of a
larger wave to contract the scope of section 1983.206 The lower
applicable civil rights statutes as the facts of his case permit irrespective of the actual or

potential overlap of statutory remedies." Johnson v. Ballard, 644 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.D. Ga.
1986)(quoting Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1983)).
206. See supra notes 26-65 and accompanying text. The contraction may reach beyond
§ 1983. See also Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Colo. 1985), affid, 816 F.2d 555
(10th Cir. 1987)(extending the Novotny rationale to preclude a concurrent claim for discrimination under § 1981, even though § 1981, unlike § 1983 and § 1985, provides substantive

rights).
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courts are faced with conflicting signals 07 and doctrinal tension 208
from the Supreme Court.
Amid the confusion, lower courts have developed several theories to deal with the Title VII-section 1983 overlap. The independent rights theory depends on a misinterpretation of Title VII's legislative history and on an overexpansive application of the Sea
Clammers and Smith holdings. Far from clarifying the area, courts
are muddying the waters by defining variously what constitutes an
independent right. Perhaps the most charitable thing that can be
said about the complete preemption theory is that it is rife with analytical mischief.
While the "and laws" theory affords plaintiffs the ability to
combine remedies and obtain sufficient protection of their rights,
courts have not adequately analyzed its theoretical underpinnings.
Theoretical support for the "and laws" theory depends on an evaluation of the comprehensiveness of Title VII. While the section 1983
remedy may be precluded by a comprehensive statutory remedial
scheme, the remedies offered by Title VII are not sufficiently comprehensive to warrant preemption of section 1983. Because the legislative history of Title VII indicates it was never intended to be exclusive, and because the operative effect of Title VII establishes that it
does not provide adequate remedies for employment discrimination,
plaintiffs should not be limited to Title VII remedies even when the
basis of their claims are Title VII-created rights.
The theories regarding the Title VII-section 1983 overlap raise
more questions than they answer. This points to the need for Congressional direction. "The proper remedy for statutory obsolescence
• . .is amendment or repeal."209 However, the latest indication is

that the Supreme Court will adopt the independent rights theory
207. The extent to which Sea Clammers and Smith limitThiboutot is uncertain. Fur-

thermore, the backdrop against which the Title VII-§ 1983 overlap may be analyzed is murky;
the implications of Alexander and Johnson seem directly contrary to those of Brown and
Novotny.

208. Compare Justice O'Connor's proposal to limit the § 1983 caseload in federal
courts, O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federaland State Courtsfrom the
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 801, 810 (1981) (written prior
to Supreme Court appointment), with Justice Blackmun's lament that the call to restrict §
1983 actions has serious consequences because "fundamental constitutional rights are at
stake." Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protectionof Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1985).
209. Sunstein, supra note 69, at 410. However, some commentators, this author included, have no desire to see the present Congress undertake the Procrustean task of stream-

lining employment discrimination laws. See id. at 439.
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without giving much thought to the underlying rights or remedies
affected. 10 Such a result would simply perpetuate the piecemeal dismantling of section 1983. Before the Supreme Court acts on the Title VII-section 1983 overlap, it should make a sensitive inquiry into
the nature of the remedies afforded to plaintiffs and how effectively
those remedies redress violations of fundamental constitutional
rights, the remedies afforded to plaintiffs and how effectively those
remedies redress violations of fundamental constitutional rights.

210. See Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1492 (1986) (adopting the independent rights theory).
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